Lucas Newby

Ms. Kelly Anthony

SU15-ENG101-W03

21 July 2015

Final Essay

Where there are simple actions of building friends and allies, wars are won.

Nobel Peace Prize recipient and architect of the Marshall Plan, George C Marshall's had three simple rules for going to war: “Never fight unless you have to; never fight alone; never fight for long”(Greitens, p. 269) With this I agree.

Wars have been fought as far back as Biblical times. Many have been lost because of inadequate and stubborn mindset and the refusal to adapt to change and develop new strategies. And these same inadequate mindsets and strategies still exist in our U.S. Department of Defense. Unfortunately, in this new age of war, something needs to change.

My question is: Given the results in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that “old-school surges” of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries, would our Department of Defense benefit greater by adapting a change in their strategies?

I believe that Greitens' theory of “Real valuable intelligence only came from real people” (p. 267) and building good relationships is a very good start. Different types of human subjects will share information voluntarily or involuntarily. The interrogator builds a relationship with the subject, a relationship that can be based on trust, fear, friendship, or any of a range of human emotions. Different types of human subjects will share information voluntarily or involuntarily. But as my mom always said, “You can catch more flies with honey than vinegar”, and “With trust you have everything, once you loose that trust, you have nothing” (Newby)

“In the name of 'force protection' the military often rolls up windows builds walls, and points rifles at the outside world. The best force protection, however is to be surrounded by friends and allies. If we'd had permission to buy local food, we could have fed ourselves at on-tenth or even one-twentieth of what is costs American taxpayers to provide us with food. We'd have had better food, and we might have built valuable friendships” (Greitens p. 268)

To further my point, in an article, “The New Rules of War”, dated February 11, 2010, author John Arquilla talks about how the U.S. military spends billions of dollars on big ships, big guns and big battalions, which are not needed, but are the wrong approach to waging war. America’s armed forces have failed, given the high stakes and dangers they routinely face, the military forces are inevitably reluctant to change or to adapt sufficiently to changed condition. Arquilla further states later in this same article:

“United States is spending huge amounts of money in ways that are actually making Americans less secure, not only against irregular insurgents, but also against smart countries building different sorts of militia. And the problem goes well beyond weapons and other high-tech items. What’s missing most of all from the U.S. military’s arsenal is a deep understanding of networking, the loose but lively interconnection between people that creates and brings a new kind of collective intelligence, power, and purpose to bear — for good and ill”.

“Civil society movements around the world have taken to networking in ways that have done far more to advance the cause of freedom than the U.S. military’s problematic efforts to bring democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan at gunpoint.”

“U.S. military leaders have not sufficiently grasped changing their concept from “few and large” to “many and small”, because the traditional, hierarchical military mindset, which holds that more is always better, that even quite small units — like a platoon of 50 or so soldiers — can wield great power when connected to others, especially friendly indigenous forces, and when networking closely with even a handful of attack aircraft”.

Yet the evidence is there. For example, beginning in late 2006 in Iraq, the U.S. command shifted little more than 5 percent of its 130,000 troops from about three dozen major (i.e., down-sized) operating bases to more than a hundred small outposts, each manned by about 50 soldiers. This was a dramatic shift from few-large to many-small, and it soon worked wonders in reducing violence, beginning well before the “surge” troops arrived. In part this happened because the physical network of platoon-sized outposts facilitated social networking with the large numbers of small tribal groups who chose to join the cause, forming the core of the “Awakening” movement”. (Arquilla)¹

Greitens had learned from his experiences from the refugee camps and many travels in other countries the need for trust. He had learned that learning the customs and traditions gained their friendship and trust. That same kind of trust played a big roll in the development of relations of counterinsurgency.

This same question, “If U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were trusted more by the locals, would they be safer?” was asked of Dr. Sarai Blincoe, a Longwood University psychology professor., in an article entitled, “Longwood psychology professor studies building trust in the Middle East” written February 11, 2013.

"The military is starting to think more about this because the type of war we’re fighting has changed from conventional—my tanks versus your tanks— to insurgencies, so we need a different approach. The enemy is not on a battlefield—they’re in the town, among the people, blending in. The military is realizing it has to learn about the local people and get them on their side. There are other models of trust in the social sciences, but we are tailoring this to the unique counterinsurgency environment."

An example of taking risks in the name of building trust can be found in the military’s decision to move its forward-operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan closer to the local community, Blincoe said, "Troops used to march out in the morning from a very secure base to the nearby town or city, then return to their base in the evening. But they found that the local people didn’t trust them or help them, so they moved their bases closer to, and integrated with, the towns and cities, which has improved the safety of both the military and the locals. They took a risk, but it was beneficial—because the people supported it. (Blincoe)²

I find this interesting because Ms. Blincoe conclusion coincides with Greitens' theory as well as Arquilla's. I was taught that change requires risk, but it is usually worth it in the end, and I have been told the definition of insanity is continuing to do as you have always done, over and over, and expecting different results. I believe this proven evidence helps strengthen the argument that the Military Defense would benefit more if they would adhere to changing their strategies. Bigger is not always best. Sometimes less or smaller is more., and much for effective. They need to wise up, learn from the enemy, and adapt to the “New Rules of War”, after all we are in the twenty-first century.

From page 218, The Heat and Fist, I would like once again to quote a paragraph:

...“Awls and Captain Campbell told me that given my time working in the war zones overseas, they wanted me to take a fresh look at our work in Afghanistan and see if there might be ways to improve our interactions with potential allies. SEALS had spent thousands of hours training to kill the enemies, but to win this war we also needed to win friends. Alliances had been key in defeating the Taliban, and we needed allies to help us hunt individual men in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another key element in defeating al Qaeda was human intelligence. The United States had the best signals and electronic intelligence in the world, but we were fighting an enemy that often passed messages via couriers who road horseback through the mountains. There was no substitute for intelligence won though interpersonal contact with Afghans. How could we adjust our operations so that we could win friends?” (Greiten)

Unfortunately until the ones that are in charge of our Department of Defense open their minds to change, determine to take a risk, for the good of all, and learn from the mistakes of the past, then all I can see is the continuation of spending billions of unnecessary money, continuation of way too many lives lost, while they continue biting themselves, and us, in the butts and putting everyone's safety at risk from the enemy, they will never be any better off than they have ever been throughout the centuries.

In conclusion, I believe I have answered, or at least put up a good argument, for my question, “Given the results in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that “old-school surges” of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries, would our Department of Defense benefit greater by adapting a change in their strategies?” We know they are aware, we know the knowledge is there, the proof is there, but there is still a question which remains unanswered, “Will they use this knowledge and proof, for the better of all?

Works Cited

Newby, Jackie. personal reference for thoughts and quotes.

Greitens, Eric. The Heart and Fist. New York: HoughtonMiffin Harcourt Publishing Co, 2012. 255-97. Print.

Arquilla, John. "The New Rules of War." Editorial. Foreign Policy Magazine 11 Feb. 2010. Web. 20 July 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/the-new-rules-of- war/ >.

Blincoe, Dr. Sarai. "Longwood psychology professor studies building trust in the Middle East -." Editorial. Longwood University-Longwood, VA 11 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 July 2015. <HTTP://Woolongong/2013releases_46856.htm>.

1 John Arquilla earned his degrees in international relations from Rosary College (BA 1975) and Standford University (MA 1989, PhD 1991). He has been teaching in the Special Operations program at the United States Navel Postgraduate School since 1993. H also serves as Chairman of the Defense Analysis Dept.

2 Blincoe began working during summer 2012 on the project, "Generating Trust in the Counterinsurgency Context," at the invitation of Lt. David Combs, a Navy researcher at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., who had previously done research on trust in the political setting. They met in graduate school at the University of Kentucky, where both earned a Ph.D. in experimental psychology.